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1. Germany’s deteriorating welfare position 
 
After  the  longest  period  of  economic  stagnation  in  the  last  six  decades  Germany 
started to recover in 2004. Compared to the poor performance in the preceding years, 
2006 and 2007 were marked by extraordinary economic growth. Real gross domestic 
product  (GDP)  as  a  measure  of  economic  activity  increased  by  2.7  per  cent  on 
average. An end of the present economic upturn is not in sight in spite of higher risks. 
In  spring  2008  almost  all  economic  forecasts  for  Germany  expected  an  ongoing 
economic  expansion  in  2008  and  in  2009.  However,  high  energy  prices,  the 
appreciation of the Euro and the gradual impacts of the U.S. financial and real estate 
turbulence are expected to slow the German economy.  
 
In terms of economic growth Germany has successfully closed ranks with the average 
performance of the other members of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 2006 
and 2007 (figure 1). Between 1995 and 2005 the German economy had on average 
grown by one percentage point less than the average of the other EMU-countries. 
Germany and Italy had been the tail lights since the mid-1990s. As a result of this 
poor  growth  performance  Germany  has  missed  the  chance  of  further  income 
improvements. Economic growth is not pursued merely for its own sake, it more or 
less determines per capita income growth and, hence, material welfare of a society. 
An international income comparison shows the relative income loss of Germany’s 
residents  (table  1).  In  1991,  Germany  ranked  eleventh  among  the  20  economies 
surveyed in table 1. Per capita GDP – adjusted for purchasing power differences – 
reached almost 19,000 US-dollar. In comparison, Ireland with a per capita income of 
around 14,500 US-dollar ranked second to last. In 2007 Germany ranked sixteenth 
while  Ireland  had  advanced  to  the  fourth  place  from  top.  The  poor  income 
performance of Germany reflects the poor growth performance during those years. 
 
However, since 2004 Germany’s situation bears a strong resemblance to the situation 
at the end of the 1980s in West Germany. On the eve of reunification there was a 
pronounced  acceleration  of  economic  growth  in  West  Germany.  Employment 
expanded  and  the  number  of  unemployed  decreased.  Against  this  background  the 
following analysis describes the economic development in West and East Germany 
since  the  end  of  the  1980s.  This  period  between  the  end  of  the  1980s  and  the  
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economic situation in 2008 can be distinguished into four sub-periods – although this 
categorisation should not be regarded as a clear cut definition:  
 
1.  The reunification boom and bust (1990 to 1996). 
2.  The new economy boom (1997 to 2000). 
3.  The long stagnation (2001 to 2004). 
4.  The little-noticed recovery (2005 to 2008) 
 
This article starts with a short description of the economic performance of West and 
East  Germany  in  the  1980s.  This  is  helpful  in  order  to  understand  some  of  the 
restructurings in the 1990s. Several figures and tables (see appendix at the end of the 
article) depict the empirical background of the following analysis. In order to draw a 
comprehensive picture, the data mostly covers the entire 1980s. Most of the time 
series end with the year 2007. 
 
2. The economic situation in Germany in the 1980s 
 
“Little economic miracle” in West Germany 
Real GDP grew in West Germany by 3.8 per cent per year on average in 1988 and 
1989. This was considerably above the moderate growth rates in the preceding period 
(figure 2). Total employment increased by 1.7 per cent per year in 1988 and 1989 and 
the number of unemployed fell from 2.23 million in 1987 to 2.04 million in 1989. As 
in 2007 the government budget was balanced in 1989 (figure 3) and the export surplus 
was an engine for growth (figure 4). 
 
The present economic situation and the one at the end of the 1980s have a preceding 
slack  period  in  common.  At  least  three  reasons  can  explain  the  dull  growth  and 
investment performance in the 1980s (Giersch/Paqué/Schmieding, 1992, 272; Carlin, 
1996, 473; Schröter, 2000, 383; Eichengreen, 2007, 252). Firstly, the negative oil 
price shocks in the mid 1970s and the early 1980s, the exorbitant wage increases and 
the  high  real  interest  rates  worsened  the  cost  situation  and  the  capital  returns 
significantly. This hampered investment and Germany’s growth potential. Secondly, 
emerging market economies built up pressure on traditional manufacturing branches  
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and the appreciation of the Deutschmark against other currencies (table 2) tightened 
competition. Thirdly, there was an institutional deterioration: an increasingly rigid 
labour market, regulations and bureaucracy inhibited the flexibility of firms to adjust 
to  external  challenges.  In  total,  these  developments  contributed  to  a  variety  of 
structural problems which finally resulted in rising unemployment (figure 5).  
 
The second half of the 1980s saw a gradual recovery which unfolded in the boom at 
the end of the decade. On the 40
th anniversary of the Deutschmark in 1988 West 
Germany enjoyed a “little economic miracle” (Weimer, 1998, 351) triggered by an 
improvement of supply side conditions which resulted from declining energy and raw 
material  prices  and  moderate  wage  policies.  Germany’s  unit  labour  cost  position 
improved.  In  addition,  the  tax  reforms  of  1986,  1988  and  1990  enhanced  labour 
incentives  and  the  investment  climate.  Better  locational  conditions  stimulated 
investment considerably. Not least the internal market project of the European Union 
had revived the political and economic landscape (Donges, 2008). The recession of 
the  early  1980s  and  the  fear  of  an  “eurosclerosis”  built  up  pressure  to  reinforce 
European integration. In 1985 the member states of the EU decided to complete the 
internal market. All barriers to the free movement of goods and services, capital and 
persons were to be abolished by the end of 1992. The goal of the Single European 
Act, which came into effect on July 1
st 1987, was the gradual accomplishment of an 
economic and monetary union in Europe. This improved the economic climate at the 
end of the 1980s.  
 
Economic Collapse in East Germany 
In  contrast  to  the  West  German  economy  the  situation  in  the  former  German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) had gradually deteriorated. The period from the early 
1980s to 1989 was once described as a “veiled economic collapse and government 
bankruptcy” (Lehmann, 2002, 349). The accompanying lack of future prospects for 
increasing numbers of the East German population had led to a growing demand for 
exit permits and, in the summer of 1989, to a stampede across other East European 
countries  and  Austria  to  West  Germany.  Furthermore  in  autumn  1989  mass 
demonstrations took place in East German cities.  
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The structural deficits of the East German economy, particularly those in the 1980s 
can  be  explained  by  at  least  four  factors  (Giersch/Paqué/Schmieding,  1992,  258; 
Ritschl,  1996;  Schröter,  2000,  402;  Eichengreen,  2007,  296;  Buch/Toubal,  2007; 
Plickert, 2008):  
 
·  Pronounced supply gaps and scarcity as a result of centralised decision making and 
the command economy were omnipresent. Most of the economic activities were 
organised in huge conglomerates (“Kombinate”). Rigid plans guided the allocation 
of  inputs  and  the  distribution  of  outputs  and  caused  permanent  bottlenecks. 
Consumption goods and inputs for firms were not available in sufficient quantities. 
The government controlled and fixed prices did not deliver reliable information 
about  the  scarcity  of  goods.  Furthermore  prices  did  not  help  to  use  resources 
efficiently. 
 
·  At the end of the 1980s the capital stock in the GDR was more or less obsolete. In 
the absence of private ownership or the control of capital markets the managers of 
the firms did not have any strong incentive to keep the capital stock intact. The 
lack of modernisation was accompanied by slow technological change compared to 
West  Europe  or  the  US.  The  centralisation  of  investment  decisions  led  to  a 
concentration on a few large-scale and obvious prestige projects. Furthermore, the 
ecological situation suffered from the modernisation and technological backlog. 
 
·  The production process in East Germany can be characterised by a relatively low 
division of labour. In the huge conglomerates a high degree of self-production of 
inputs dominated – so that the economy forfeited the benefits of an inter-firm and 
inter-sectoral  division  of  labour  on  the  basis  of  comparative  advantages.  The 
management of the firms was expected to reach the fixed targets and fulfil the 
government  plan.  As  firms  could  not  go  bankrupt,  they  had  few  incentives  to 
improve their efficiency. In addition, the division of labour within the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance – an economic cooperation among East European 
countries – was determined by political and not by economic criteria.  
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·  As in most socialist economies the service sector – in particular banks, insurance 
companies and the wholesale and retail sector – was underdeveloped. By the end of 
the  1980s  East  Germany’s  industry-  and  agriculture-based  economy  lagged  far 
behind the developed economies in the Western world.  
 
As a result of these deficiencies per capita production in East Germany amounted only 
to 56 per cent of the West German level at the end of the 1980s (Heske, 2005, 70). In 
2007,  the  gap  was  still  remarkable,  but  had  diminished  to  one  third  of  the  West 
German level (figure 6).  
 
3. Reunification boom and bust (1990 to 1996) 
 
The  peaceful  revolution  in  East  Germany  in  1989  was  the  starting  point  for 
Germany’s political and economic reunification. On November 9
th 1989 the Berlin 
Wall  toppled.  The  following  migration  from  East  to  West  and  the  growing 
expectations  of  those  who  stayed  in  East  Germany  made  a  gradual  economic 
reunification almost impossible. The roadmap was dictated by the fear of an economic 
breakdown and political instabilities. When the situation became more unstable in 
early 1990 a swift economic, monetary and social union was agreed on which made 
the reunification irreversible (Sinn/Sinn, 1991, 11; Giersch/Paqué/ Schmieding, 1992, 
261). On July 1
st 1990, the Deutschmark was introduced as the sole legal tender and 
the  West  German  economic  order  has  come  into  effect.  As  a  symbol  of  West 
Germany’s  social  market  economy,  democracy  and  wealth  the  Deutschmark  was 
supposed to become the symbol of reunification (Weimer, 1998, 367). The political 
reunification followed on October 3
rd 1990.  
 
Increasing adjustment burdens in East Germany  
The  economic,  monetary  and  social  union  which  started  on  July  1
st  1990,  has 
substantially impacted the East German economy. On the one hand, it made clear that 
the  system  change  was  credible  and  irreversible.  In  contrast  to  other  countries  in 
transition East Germany adopted the institutional infrastructure long established in 
West  Germany.  East  German  communities  benefited  from  West  German 
creditworthiness,  which  relieved  their  financial  burdens.  Furthermore,  firms  and  
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communities  in  East  Germany  received  unrestricted  access  to  the  world  capital 
markets. On the other hand, reunification brought all the complexities and deficiencies 
of the West German institutions to the East (Giersch/Paqué/Schmieding, 1992, 268).  
 
As part of the monetary union most financial assets and liabilities were converted at a 
rate of 2 Eastmarks to 1 Deutschmark. Recurrent payments – e. g. rents and wages – 
were converted at a rate of 1 to 1. As a result East German products lost much of their 
competitiveness (Sinn/Sinn, 1991, 34). For firms in the East this meant a huge labour 
cost  shock. Saddled  with  an  outdated  capital  stock  the  bulk  of  the  manufacturing 
capacities  became  obsolete.  Goods  which  had  been  highly  subsidised  before  had 
hardly any chance to survive under these conditions. The huge conglomerates were 
not able to keep up with their competitors from the West. In addition, preferences of 
the East Germans shifted from East German products to often cheaper and superior 
goods from the West. The huge demand push in West Germany thus went hand in 
hand with strongly subdued demand for East German products. In retrospect it is no 
surprise that particularly the manufacturing sector and its employees had to bear the 
brunt in the initial stage of reunification. 
 
A  new  fiscal  transfer  system  was  established  in  order  to  cushion  the  gradually 
surfacing and growing structural and financial burdens in East Germany (Lichtblau, 
1995). From 1991 to 2003 the total gross transfer volume amounted to 1,200 billion 
Euro.  Of  course,  one  goal  of  this  system  was  to  promote  the  acceptance  of 
reunification and to guarantee social peace and economic stability. As a result of the 
transfers the improvements in the living standard were increasingly decoupled from 
the  partial  collapse  of  the  economy.  Against  this  background  there  was  growing 
concern  that  East  Germany  would  become  a  “transfer  economy”  or  a  “German 
Mezzogiorno” (Sinn, 2002). Also convergence between wages in East and West was 
formulated as a political goal. In economic terms this meant that the competitiveness 
of East German firms would further deteriorate while productivity in the East lagged 
far behind the Western level (Grömling/Schnabel, 1998; Sinn, 2002; Burda, 2006). 
 
The economic flaws of the reunification – e. g. the monetary conversion of wages at a 
rate of 1 to 1, the wage convergence between East and West, the imposition of West 
Germany’s  rigid  labour  market  institutions  –  created  a  considerable  need  to  
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restructure  the  supply  side  of  the  East  German  economy.  But  it  should  not  be 
forgotten that the East German manufacturing sector stabilised quickly – albeit at a 
low level. Figure 7 shows East German manufacturing performance as a percentage of 
total German manufacturing value added from 1991 to 2007. The decline of the East 
German share already stopped in 1992. Afterwards the share steadily increased. This 
gain in significance of the East was also the result of a de-industrialisation in the 
West. In addition, the reconstruction process in East Germany triggered an immense 
construction  boom  as  the  modernisation  backlog  created  a  huge  demand  for 
infrastructure  investment  –  new  roads  and  public  utilities  (e. g.  waterworks, 
purification plants) –, new commercial areas and residential construction.  
 
Reunification boom in West Germany and an ailing world economy  
In  economic  terms  the  reunification  stimulated  the  West  German  economy.  West 
Germany boomed in the early 1990s while some other economies such as the United 
States and the United Kingdom were hit by a recession. In 1990 and 1991 real GDP 
grew by more than 5 per cent annually in Germany. This was considerably more than 
during the preceding decade (figure 2). The number of unemployed people diminished 
in West Germany from 2 to 1.7 million in 1991. High migration to West Germany 
triggered a construction boom. In addition the reconstruction process in East Germany 
animated suppliers in the West. After a long time Germany also realised a current 
account deficit (table 3): 
● The traditional surplus in international merchandise trade diminished from more 
than 70 billion Euro in 1989 to a mere 16 billion Euro in 1991. Some of the goods 
earmarked for export were re-directed to East Germany. Moreover, the ailing world 
economy  slowed  down  exports  while  imports  increased  in  order  to  satisfy  the 
additional demand in East Germany.  
●  The  growing  current  account  deficit  also  resulted  from  an  increasing  deficit  in 
international service trade – particularly in connection with expanding tourism. In 
addition, current transfers led to a growing deficit due to higher payments to the EU 
and  payments  to  Russia  because  of  the  troop withdrawals  and  due  to  sharing  the 
financial burden of the Gulf war with the U.S.  
●  The  reverse  side  of  the  current  account  deficit  was  a  capital  account  surplus. 
Increasing  capital  imports  were  necessary  to  cope  with  the  financial  burdens  of 
reunification. The net capital imports were not used for foreign direct investment in  
  10
Germany but to finance the emerging public deficit, so that reunification caused a 
twin deficit – a current account and a government deficit.  
 
The euphoria which accompanied reunification and the world championship in soccer 
in  1990  raised  expectations  that  Germany  would  become  an  engine  of  growth  in 
Europe for a long time. However, the reunification boom lasted only for a while. 
 
A sudden end to the reunification boom in West Germany  
The foundations of large scale restructuring in West Germany had been laid in the 
early 1990s. The reunification era started with an economic boom in the West and a 
concurrent contraction in  the  East.  In  1993,  however,  the  West  German  economy 
slipped into a severe recession with real GDP declining by 2.2 percent. East German 
GDP was still growing due to the construction boom and the transfer-driven private 
and  public  consumption.  It  expanded  by  12.6  per  cent  in  real  terms  in  1993. 
Unemployment  had  already  increased  in  West  Germany  in  1992  and  in  1993  it 
amounted to 2.27 million people – 580,000 more than during the 1991 trough. Figure 
5 shows that unemployment continued to increase up to 1997, when more than 3 
million people were registered unemployed. The following arguments can explain the 
sudden death of the reunification boom:  
● It has already been mentioned that the balance of payments changed abruptly with 
reunification. The West German export business weakened because of the re-direction 
of goods from West to East Germany and because of the slackening global demand. 
● The competitiveness of the German economy suffered from the development of 
wages and non-wage labour costs (Berthold, 1992; Donges, 2008; Peter, 2008). The 
latter were driven by rising social security contributions after the introduction of the 
West German social security system in the East (social union). 
● The Deutschmark appreciated substantially in the wake of the crisis of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) in 1992 (Eichengreen, 2007, 357). Exchange rates within 
Europe and against major non-European currencies had been relatively stable up to 
this time. However, the internal stability of the EMS came under pressure when the 
Maastricht treaty was rejected by Denmark and other countries started to doubt the 
wisdom  of  the  EMU.  Large  price  and  productivity  differences  among  the  EMS 
member states and increasing interest rates in Germany due to rising inflation (figure 
8) caused speculative attacks on EMS currencies that were thought to be overvalued.  
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All of these developments finally led to the appreciation of the Deutschmark against 
some EMS currencies (table 2).  
 
The  West  German  manufacturing  sector,  in  particular,  experienced  increasing 
pressure in 1993. The manufacturing share in total value added decreased from 29 per 
cent in 1991 to 25.5 per cent in 1993. Figure 9 shows that the de-industrialisation in 
West Germany – in contrast to East Germany – continued until the mid-1990s. In 
1996, only 24.1 per cent of GDP originated from manufacturing firms – 5 percentage 
points  less  than  1991.  There  was  only  a  short  recovery  in  1994  before  the  West 
German  economy  again  lost  momentum  in  1995  and  1996.  Instabilities  in  Latin 
America  (“Tequilla  crisis  in  Mexico”)  and  ongoing  structural  problems  in  Japan 
triggered another wave of appreciation of the Deutschmark (table 2). In addition, the 
cost situation of firms deteriorated as a result of tax increases (solidarity surcharge) 
and rising social security contributions (introduction of the long-term care insurance). 
Furthermore, there were high wage settlements in certain industries in 1995 and the 
construction boom abated. All in all, the reunification boom, which was supposed to 
be a long-run stimulus for the German economy, ended in the mid-1990s. The number 
of unemployed had already begun to increase in 1992.  
 
4. Restructuring and the New Economy boom (1997 to 2000) 
 
The  period  1997  to  2000  was  also  an  eventful  time  for  Germany  –  although 
macroeconomic  indicators  show  a  stable  and  upward  sloping  development.  In 
retrospect, the crises in Asia and Russia in 1997 had no strong adverse effect on the 
German economy. After 16 years in power the government coalition of CDU, CSU 
and FDP was replaced by a coalition of SPD and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen in autumn 
1998 which started with an unclear course.  
 
The  second  part  of  the  1990s  can  be  characterised  as  the  high  time  of  business 
restructuring in Germany. Huge adjustment burdens from the early 1990s – increasing 
labour  costs,  appreciation  of  the  Deutschmark,  the  deterioration  of  supply  side 
conditions  due  to  higher  taxes  and  non-wage  labour  costs  as  well  as  increasing 
international  competition  from  emerging  and  transformation  countries  led  to  a  
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fundamental reorganisation and modernisation of the production process. In view of 
the accumulated cost handicaps – figure 10 shows the deterioration of German unit 
labour  costs  in  comparison  with  other  industrialised  countries  –  cost-cutting 
programmes often prevailed. Downsizing and lean production were popular. German 
firms  have  pursued  two  different  strategies  to  modernise  their  product  range  and 
particularly their production processes (Grömling, 2008):  
 
● First, the intensification of the inter-sectoral division of labour. Industrial firms are 
now offering services alongside with their products without necessarily producing the 
individual components themselves. Parallel to expanding their services manufacturing 
firms concentrated on core production activities and outsourced certain services to 
specialist companies. This shift from producing one’s own goods or services toward 
buying  product  components  on  the  market  has  grown  popular  for  many  reasons: 
companies  consider  factors  such  as  the  availability  of  knowledge  and  skills, 
differences  in  quality  and  cost,  the  flexibility  of  fixed  costs  and  production 
bottlenecks before they decide in favour of “making or buying” specific components. 
Figure  11  shows  an  increasing  inter-sectoral  division  of  labour  in  manufacturing 
during the 1990s. In 2006, intermediate inputs from other sectors made up around 68 
per cent of the manufacturing sector’s gross output, up from just 62 per cent in 1991. 
However, there is a marked difference between the 1990s and the ensuing period. The 
intermediate inputs ratio calculated on the basis of nominal values increased by 4½ 
percentage points between 1991 (62 percent) and 2000 with the biggest increase in the 
second half of the 1990s. In recent years, however, there has been a more or less 
pronounced sideways movement of the intermediate inputs share. The fact that it is 
rising again now is not a result of outsourcing, but one of rising prices of energy and 
raw materials.  
 
● Second, the expansion of the international division of labour. An increasing share of 
imported  intermediate  inputs  empirically  supports  this  development.  Some  former 
domestic production has been shifted to subsidiaries or foreign firms abroad. Input-
output tables can be used as empirical evidence for this cross-border outsourcing or 
offshoring trends (Grömling, 2007b). According to these calculations 30 per cent of 
manufacturing production in Germany originated in 2003 from the firms’ own value 
added – which corresponds to an intermediate input share of 70 per cent (figure 12).  
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In 2003 imported intermediate inputs accounted for 18 per cent of  manufacturing 
production. In comparison with the manufacturing structure in 2000 (which is directly 
comparable with that of 2003) imported inputs had lost some importance. In contrast, 
during the 1990s the share of manufacturing firms’ own value added shrunk by 5 
percentage  points  to  32  percent.  This  was  also  the  case  for  inputs  from  other 
manufacturing  firms.  In  return  the  shares  of  service  inputs  and  imported  inputs 
significantly increased. The most important structural changes occurred in the second 
half  of  the  1990s,  when  economic  integration  with  the  Eastern  Europe  countries 
actually took place.  
 
These developments are reflected in ups and downs of the German labour market. In 
1997  the  average  number  of  unemployed  people  for  the  first  time  surpassed  the 
threshold of 3 million. Job creation in the service sector was by far not enough to 
compensate for job losses in manufacturing. Also in East Germany the number of 
unemployed peaked at 1.7 million. This was followed by a pronounced recovery. By 
2000  the  number  of  registered  unemployed  had  declined  to  2.5  million  in  West 
Germany. In East Germany unemployment remained high but stable until 2001. From 
1997 to 2001 the number of employees increased in total by 1.85 million people in 
Germany.  
 
The decline in unemployment and the concurrent job creation can be explained by the 
launch of moderate wage policies. From 1991 to 1996 labour costs per hour worked 
increased on average by 5 per cent per year. During the following decade this was 1.6 
per cent per year. As figure 10 shows, unit labour costs were stable over the second 
half of the 1990s. Wages and productivity increased at the same pace. In contrast, the 
other countries` aggregate faced a pronounced increase. The widening cost gap of the 
early 1990s was finally closed again at the end of the decade.  
 
The labour market improvement was also promoted by a favourable macroeconomic 
environment.  Business  investments  recovered  not  least  as  a  result  of  improving 
profits. The 1990s were also characterised by very low oil and raw material prices. 
The price per barrel crude oil was mostly below 20 US-dollar in the 1990s – in 1998 it 
even  dropped  below  13  US-dollar  on  average  (figure  13).  Furthermore,  the 
Deutschmark was not appreciated against other currencies during the second half of  
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the  1990s.  The  introduction  of  the  Euro  at  the  start  of  1999  had  ameliorated 
Germany’s  export  position  because  the  common  currency  for  the  initial  eleven 
countries continued to lose value until 2002 (figure 14).  
 
The introduction of the Euro also coined the period 1997 to 2000. Although the cash 
changeover occurred on January 1
st 2002, the year 1999 marked the actual start of the 
EMU – characterised by irrevocably fixed exchange rates and the responsibility of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) for monetary policy in the Euro area. A long period of 
discussions and preparations ended, which had begun in 1989 with a blueprint for the 
EMU, the so-called Delors Report. The Maastricht treaty, which was the decisive step 
towards the EMU, was signed in 1992. It defined convergence criteria which member 
states would have to satisfy generally before participating in the EMU, e. g. limits for 
government deficit and government debt, price stability and interest rate stability. This 
started a convergence process, which resulted in significantly lower interest rates in 
the participating countries.  
 
In addition to declining interest rates a remarkable stock market boom in the wake of 
the  so-called  new  economy  enhanced  the  macroeconomic  environment.  New 
economy  can  be  interpreted  as  the  various  effects  of  modern  information  and 
communication technologies (ICT) on the macroeconomic development – e. g. the 
accelerated growth of labour productivity due to modern ICT. It became possible and 
easier  to  optimise  production  processes  and  to  establish  international  production 
networks by making use of ICT. Not least because of these modern technologies the 
bulk  of  firm  restructurings  took  place  during  the  ICT  boom.  According  to  model 
calculations for the US economy, half of the productivity progress in the late 1990s 
was due to modern ICT (CEA, 2001, p. 28). However, these innovations also caused 
an upswing in investment. And in addition the stock market was stimulated by ICT 
products  and  ICT  firms.  It  is  possible  that  the  investment  behaviour  of  private 
households also changed substantially during this time – e. g. the number of private 
shareholder  surged.  Finally  the  stock  market  development  was  more  dynamic  in 
Germany than in the United States (figure 15). The stock market rally substantially 
improved  corporate  financing  conditions  and  the  increasing  wealth  of  private 
households contributed to a marked recovery of private consumption. From 1998 to 
2000 real private consumption increased, on average, by 2.2 per cent per year. At the  
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same time, corporate investment in machinery and equipment surged by more than 10 
per  cent  annually.  Only  construction  investment  slowed  the  macroeconomic 
development after 1995. In 2000 real construction investment was 7.5 per cent below 
the  1995  level.  Especially  non-residential  construction  faced  a  severe  crash.  The 
construction  crisis  was,  on  one  hand,  a  result  of  a  normalisation  process  in  East 
Germany.  A  pronounced  adjustment  process  set  in  after  the  fast  and  broad 
reconstruction  in  the  early  years  of  reunification.  On  the  other  hand,  construction 
investment  in  West  Germany  levelled  as  a  result  of  strained  coffers  in  German 
municipalities and by the absence of the demographic impulses of the early 1990s.  
 
5. The long stagnation (2001 to 2004) 
 
Despite the ongoing construction bust at the turn of the millennium there was broad 
confidence regarding the countries` economic prospects. Germany had been waiting 
for the positive effects of the new economy. In terms of economic growth, 2000 was 
the best year since the early 1990s. Real GDP expanded by 3.2 percent. Employment 
grew by 1.9 per cent or 720,000 peeople in 2000. Even in the first quarter of 2001 real 
GDP surged. As in other countries, this was followed by a pronounced deceleration. 
The US economy started to decline in mid-2000 and in summer 2001 it was hit by a 
recession – for the following reasons: 
● There was an unusually strong oil price hike in 2000. Compared to the previous 
year the oil price rose by 10 US-dollar to an annual average of 28 US-dollar per 
barrel. Within two years the price per barrel crude oil had doubled.  
● The new economy bubble burst. Many of the companies quoted on the American 
NASDAQ lost in value after March 2000. Some of them were not able to meet the 
exuberant expectations. Against this backdrop various ICT firms collapsed. The share 
market crash was deepened by accounting scandals. Figure 15 shows that the German 
stock market was hit more severely than the US market.  
● As the situation in the United States had calmed down the terror attacks of 9/11 
created a new dimension of geopolitical uncertainty.  
 
In conclusion, the German economy suffered more than the US economy or that of 
other European countries. All in all, price and seasonally adjusted GDP stagnated  
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from spring 2001 into 2004. This marked the longest stagnation in postwar Germany. 
This  slack  economic  period  was  accompanied  by  the  following  developments 
(Schumacher, 2003; Hüther, 2008): 
 
● Job loss: Despite waning production employment increased even in 2001. Firms 
hesitated or were not able to adjust their workforce immediately, although total hours 
worked  had  already  been  cut  back  by  shorter  working  times.  In  2002  and  2003 
employment  fell  by  almost  600,000  people.  Unemployment  increased  from  3.85 
million  in  2001  to  an  average  of  4.9  million  in  2005.  The  number  of  registered 
unemployed  temporarily  exceeded  5  million  in  2005  mainly  because  of  rising 
unemployment in West Germany (figure 5).  
 
● Poor consumption: The job loss weakened the income dynamics and, therefore, 
private consumption (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007a; Lesch, 2007). In addition, the 
initial stock market losses and increasing energy prices put a brake on consumption.  
 
●  Investment  crisis:  Gross  fixed  capital  formation  receded  from  2001  to  2004. 
Construction  investment  declined  year  by  year  from  2000  into  2005.  In  2005  it 
amounted  to  only  76  per  cent  of  the  peak  level  of  1995.  But  also  investment  in 
machinery  and  equipment,  which  generally  responds  relatively  strong  to  business 
climate changes, plummeted in 2001 and 2002. A slight recovery started in 2004.  
 
● Export success: At first the weaker pace of the world economy decelerated German 
export growth – although there had been no decline in absolute numbers. Despite the 
appreciation of the Euro in 2002 exports remained steady. However, the growth of 
real exports in 2003 by 2.5 per cent had been the slowest since the crisis of 1993. In 
2004 they increased by 10 per cent and the German export motor started to roll again. 
Figure  4  shows  that  in  2001,  2002  and  2004  economic  growth  in  Germany  was 
exclusively determined by an export surplus.  
 
● End of de-industrialisation: The output approach of GDP reveals another feature 
of  the  economic  development  in  Germany.  The  year  2000  was  a  boom  year  for 
German manufacturing – real value added increased by almost 7 percent. Instead, 
2002 saw a decline by 2 percent. However, manufacturing had not lost importance  
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within  the  German  economic  structure  since  the  mid  1990s.  The  share  of 
manufacturing in total value added remained constant over this period. Despite the 
increasing  value  added  and  the  stable  output  share  the  manufacturing  sector  had, 
however, not been able to stabilise its employment level (Bachmann/Burda, 2007). 
Technological progress and a growing importance of private employment agencies, 
which are statistically attributed to the service sector, can explain these diverging 
sectoral  trends  of  output  and  employment.  An  intensified  inter-sectoral  or 
international  division  of  labour  is  only  a  limited  explanation.  Although  the 
enlargement of the EU took place formally in 2004, the real effects accrued mostly in 
the 1990s.  
 
The precarious economic situation after the boom in 2000 – especially in comparison 
to other European countries – led to a reorientation of economic policy in spring 2003. 
Locational conditions had worsened after the re-election of the red-green coalition in 
September  2002  –  because  of  hastily  enacted  tax  increases  as  well  as  higher 
contributions and assessment limits in the social security system. Despite numerous 
and justified caveats (Berthold/Berchem, 2005) the reforms of the so-called “Agenda 
2010” did, however, launch a political turnaround in March 2003. Based on the report 
of the German Council of Economic Experts “Twenty proposals for employment and 
growth” (SVR, 2002) the labour market was in part deregulated, the public health 
system was partly reshuffled, unemployment assistance and social assistance were 
merged and the pension insurance system was somewhat rearranged.  
 
6. The little noticed recovery (2004-2008) 
 
In  2006  and  2007  real  GDP  grew  on  average  by  2.7  percent.  The  labour  market 
improved significantly. Employment increased by 891,000 people from 2005 to 2007. 
At the end of 2007 more than 40 million persons were in employment. The number of 
unemployed decreased from more than 5 million in 2005 to 3.5 million at the end of 
2007.  As  a  result  of  growth-induced  revenues  and  only  moderate  expenditures 
increases the government was able to end the deficit practice over the last decades 
(figure 2). Four factors explain this pronounced economic recovery: 
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Booming world economy: Between 2003 and 2007 global economic activities grew 
at an unprecedented pace. In real terms world trade expanded, on average, by almost 8 
per cent per year. Several developments contributed to this boom. First, the intensified 
integration of Asia into the world economy. Second, the extraordinary improvement 
of the growth performance of countries with huge energy and raw material resources. 
Third, the solid catching up process which took place in Eastern European countries. 
All  three  factors  allowed  German  firms  with  their  manufacturing-based  product 
portfolio to make good use of this global growth potential (Deutsche Bundesbank, 
2006; Danninger/Joutz, 2007; Grömling, 2007a). These factors and the combination 
of  high  quality  and  highly  differentiated  manufactured  goods,  a  broad  range  of 
associated  services  and  a  modern  global  network  made  possible  an  extraordinary 
export boom of German firms. No other country worldwide has been in a position to 
export more manufactured goods during the last couple of years. The recovery of the 
German  economy  has  been  driven  to  a  large  extent  by  exports  and  thus  by  the 
manufacturing sectors which account for almost 90 per cent of German foreign trade. 
Thus, more than half of Germany’s economic growth since 2001 has resulted from 
export surpluses (figure 4).  
 
Improving competitiveness: The German export boom, which started in the second 
half of the 1990s, can also be explained by a higher degree of cost discipline. While 
nominal labour costs per hour worked had surged by 5 per cent per year on average 
from 1991 to 1996, they went up by only 1.6 per cent annually during the subsequent 
decade. Despite this moderate increase German labour costs still exceed those of most 
other countries (Schröder, 2007). The same applies to its unit labour costs, which also 
take the productivity of the workforce into account, even though the cost disadvantage 
built up during the early 1990s has shrunk recently (figure 10). In contrast to Germany 
unit labour costs decreased in the first half of the 1990s, on average, in the 15 other 
countries included in figure 5 before the development reversed in the second half of 
the  1990s  with  stable  unit  labour  costs  in  Germany  and  rising  costs  in  the  other 
countries. In 2003 they started to decline in Germany and simultaneously abroad, 
where they stabilised after 2004. The development of exchange rates also contributed 
to the export-driven recovery and the comeback of the German manufacturing sector 
(figure 14). Although the Euro has appreciated strongly against the US-Dollar since 
2002, the start of the German export expansion coincided with a weak Euro between  
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1999 and 2002 and the fact that the former currencies of the EMU members can no 
longer depreciate against the German currency.  
 
Restructuring: The excellent foreign position of the German manufacturing sector is, 
to  some  extent,  the  result  of  numerous  restructuring  processes  which mostly  took 
place in the second half of the 1990s. Manufacturing had become less important in the 
early 1990s. Large scale restructuring followed this de-industrialisation. In contrast, 
the  present  upswing  is  dominated  almost  exclusively  by  the  manufacturing  sector 
which has increasingly profited from this restructuring in recent years.  
 
Economic reforms: The economic reforms initiated in 2003 can be seen as another 
explanation for Germany’s rebounding (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007b). The so-called 
“Agenda  2010”  marked  a  political  turnaround  in  2003.  A  study  by  the  Cologne 
Institute for Economic Research (Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln) shows the 
high impact of certain factors like unemployment, business investment and taxes on 
economic growth (Grömling/Plünnecke/Scharnagel, 2007). According to this study 
the potential growth rate has been significantly higher since 2003 and the reforms 
have contributed one third to the acceleration of growth in Germany:  
●  Firms  have  created  more  jobs  and  the  unemployment  rate  has  fallen  –  which 
resulted in a growth effect of 0.5 percentage points. This was due to various labour 
market reforms, such as the relaxation of employment protection and more incentives 
for unemployed to seek employment because of a shorter period of entitlement for 
unemployment benefits (Boss et al., 2007).  
●  Tax  reductions  have  improved  the  investment  climate  in  Germany.  Increasing 
business investments have contributed 0.4 percentage points to the enhanced potential 
growth rate. 
● Government has stopped reducing its own investment and therefore has increased 
trend growth by 0.3 percentage points. 
● Government budget policy has been more or less neutral. While the consolidation of 
the  budget  spurred  growth  the  tax  increases  (e.  g.  higher  value  added  tax)  have 
hampered it.  
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Winners and losers of the latest upswing 
To the surprise of many Germany has emerged from its lethargy in economic growth 
terms. Despite the immense labour market improvements – in 2006 and 2007 in total 
891,000 new jobs were created and the number of unemployed fell by more than a 
million – the opinion prevails that only a minority of the population benefits from the 
recovery  (Hüther,  2008).  Therefore,  this  period  can  be  titled  as  the  almost  non-
perceived or little noticed recovery. It is obviously a matter of perspectives of which 
at least four can be discerned: 
 
● An economic downturn and the subsequent recovery are accompanied by structural 
changes. Several branches win, others lose in importance. With regard to the recent 
business cycle, firms in export-oriented sectors and their employees have particularly 
benefited. Firms and employees in manufacturing-related service branches have also 
improved their position. By contrast, consumption and construction related branches 
have remained in the shade of the upturn.  
 
● The winners are not equally distributed across the country. Cluster-regions with 
powerful  export  firms  working  in  collaboration  with  a  network  of  suppliers  have 
shown  a  significantly  better  labour  market  performance  in  recent  years 
(Lichtblau/Neligan/Richter, 2005).  
 
● With regard to income developments the better qualified should have come out best. 
Structural change towards modern and highly sophisticated products in combination 
with  skill  and  knowledge-intensive  services  favours  employees  with  the  relevant 
qualifications.  The  labour  market  reforms  have,  however,  also  enhanced  the 
employment opportunities and earnings capacity of low-qualified persons. 
 
● Profits and property incomes have developed more dynamically in recent years than 
total compensation of employees (Grömling, 2006). Therefore, the so-called labour 
share in 2004 had for the first time after reunification declined below 70 per cent of 
national income (figure 17). In 2007 it amounted to only 65 percent. Despite slight 
fluctuations, compensations for labour as a percentage of national income has ranged 
between 70 and 72 per cent since the mid-1980s. The recent sharp decline, however, 
allows several explanations: the recovery of business profits, the increasing property  
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income of private households and the growing share of self-employed, whose labour 
income is statistically part of profit and property incomes. Moreover, there have been 
changes in the personal income distribution as a result of the structural change and the 
higher importance of human capital and property income. In addition, the income 
situation is currently tense because real incomes have  more or less stagnated and 
moderate nominal increases have been absorbed by rising inflation in the wake of 
soaring energy prices and the increase in the value added tax from 16 to 19 per cent in 
2007. 
 
7. Future challenges 
 
Since 2004 the German economy has been on the road of recovery. It has benefited 
extraordinarily  from  the  global  boom,  because  companies  increased  their 
competitiveness by restructuring and more efficient cost management. Politics have 
also  contributed  to  the  recovery  by  improving  growth  conditions 
(Grömling/Plünnecke/Scharnagel, 2007; Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007b). More than a 
third of the growth acceleration from 2003 to 2007 was based on the improved growth 
determinants as a result of political measures. But a once-off effort is not sufficient in 
order to improve the growth potential in the long run. A continuous process of further 
improvements is necessary. The reform dividend in the form of a higher potential 
growth rate and more employment has made clear that reforms pay. However, the 
current  good  economic  situation  has  tempted  politicians  to  refrain  from  further 
reforms. Table 1 has already shown what happens when the growth drivers of an 
economy lose their grip. Economic growth is not pursued for its own sake but it 
determines  the  macroeconomic  income  development.  Reforms  which  stimulate 
economic growth render a yield in the form of more jobs and higher income.  
 
The political orientation, therefore, will determine whether Germany will be able to 
cope with the following challenges in the future:  
 
● Structural change and globalization: In contrast to other countries a slight re-
industrialisation has taken place in Germany over the last decade (Grömling, 2007a; 
2008). Manufacturing – especially in combination with product-related services – has  
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gained ground. The economic catching up of many emerging markets together with a 
growing  world  population  raise  hopes  that  Germany  with  its  highly  specialised 
industry will benefit from future global growth and trade. The quality of the locational 
conditions will decide whether manufacturing companies located in Germany will be 
able to compete successfully with their international rivals. 
 
● Technological change: Germany has to bring out permanent innovations in order 
to exploit the global opportunities and to stabilise or even create jobs. Future wealth 
depends  on  innovations  and  domestic  investment.  One  prerequisite  is  a  modern 
educational system. In addition, the supply side conditions – e. g. the efficiency of the 
tax  system  and  the  extent  of  bureaucracy  – will  influence  the  number  of  modern 
companies and innovative products.  
 
●  Demographic  change:  Last  but  not  least,  the  future  economic  development 
depends on the demographic trends. The German population will shrink and age over 
the coming decades (figure 18). On average, there will be more older people in all 
European  countries.  This  must  not  necessarily  be  bad  for  economic  growth 
(Grömling, 2004). A growing world population and the accompanying demand for 
modern  goods  and  services  might  stimulate  the  export-oriented  branches  of  an 
economy. However, this requires substantial efforts by companies, employees and the 
government. Firms and their employees will have to learn how to cope with a smaller 
and, on average, older workforce. In addition, the demographic change will have far 
reaching effects on the innovativeness of a society. New ways of further education 
and human resource management will be needed. The government must safeguard its 
budget  and the  social security  system  against  the  shrinking  and  aging  population. 
Therefore an ongoing consolidation of the budget and a decoupling of social security 
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Figure 1: Economic Growth in International Comparison
Percentage change of real GDP from previous period
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Table 1: Per Capita Income in International Comparison   
Per capita GDP in purchasing power parity Dollar; Source: IMF 
         
  1991      2007 
Luxembourg  34.731  1  Luxembourg  80.457 
Norway  24.904  2  Norway  53.037 
Switzerland  24.502  3  United States  45.845 
United States  23.663  4  Ireland  43.144 
Austria  20.385  5  Hong Kong   41.994 
Netherlands  20.052  6  Switzerland  41.128 
Japan  19.936  7  Netherlands  38.486 
Canada  19.628  8  Canada  38.435 
Germany  19.536  9  Austria  38.399 
Denmark  19.421  10  Denmark  37.392 
France  18.846  11  Sweden  36.494 
Belgium  18.711  12  Australia  36.258 
Sweden  18.388  13  Finland  35.280 
Hong Kong   18.362  14  Belgium  35.273 
Italy  17.986  15  United Kingdom  35.134 
Australia  17.675  16  Germany  34.181 
United Kingdom  16.943  17  Japan  33.577 
Finland  16.486  18  France  33.188 
Spain  15.012  19  Italy  30.448 






Figure 2: Economic Growth in Germany 
Percentage change of real GDP from previous period, 1980 to 1990 West 
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Figure 3: Germanys Government Financial Balance
General government financial balance as a percentage of GDP; 1980 to 
1990 West Germany, from 1991 Germany; 

















Figure 4: Domestic and Foreign Contributions to German Growth 
Contributions of net exports and domestic demand to the percent change 
in real GDP in percentage points; 














Figure 5: Unemployment in Germany
Registered unemployed persons in 1.000; 


















Table 2: Exchange Rates of the Deutschmark            
Deutschmark (DM) per unit of other currency           
                 
















1980  91,5  4,2  2,1  1,8  43,0  0,8  14,0  108,5 
1981  90,6  4,6  2,0  2,3  41,6  1,0  14,2  115,3 
1982  90,9  4,2  1,8  2,4  37,0  1,0  14,2  119,7 
1983  89,5  3,9  1,7  2,6  33,6  1,1  14,2  121,6 
1984  88,7  3,8  1,6  2,8  32,6  1,2  14,2  121,2 
1985  88,7  3,8  1,5  2,9  32,8  1,2  14,2  120,0 
1986  88,6  3,2  1,5  2,2  31,3  1,3  14,2  120,9 
1987  88,7  2,9  1,4  1,8  29,9  1,2  14,2  120,6 
1988  88,9  3,1  1,3  1,8  29,5  1,4  14,2  120,1 
1989  88,6  3,1  1,4  1,9  29,5  1,4  14,2  115,0 
1990  88,8  2,9  1,3  1,6  29,7  1,1  14,2  116,5 
1991  88,7  2,9  1,3  1,7  29,4  1,2  14,2  115,7 
1992  88,8  2,8  1,3  1,6  29,5  1,2  14,2  111,2 
1993  89,0  2,5  1,1  1,7  29,2  1,5  14,2  111,9 
1994  89,2  2,5  1,0  1,6  29,2  1,6  14,2  118,7 
1995  89,3  2,3  0,9  1,4  28,7  1,5  14,2  121,2 
1996  89,2  2,3  1,0  1,5  29,4  1,4  14,2  121,9 
1997  88,9  2,8  1,0  1,7  29,7  1,4  14,2  119,5 
1998  88,7  2,9  1,0  1,8  29,8  1,3  14,2  121,4 
                 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank             
 
  
Figure 6: Convergence in Germany 
East German nominal per capita GDP as a percentage of the West 
German value; 
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Figure 7: Share of East German Manufacturing 
East German manufacturing value added as a percentage of total 
German manufacturing value added; 













Table 3         
The German Balance of Payments     
Balances in billion Euro       
         
   Current Account   Capital Account 
Balances












1980  -12,4  6,9  0,0  -4,0 
1981  -4,5  17,5  3,1  -4,8 
1982  6,4  30,0  -1,4  -2,8 
1983  6,4  25,3  -8,3  -2,6 
1984  14,7  31,4  -19,1  -6,1 
1985  26,4  41,8  -28,6  -6,9 
1986  45,4  60,2  -43,2  -9,9 
1987  43,0  62,0  -20,0  -7,2 
1988  45,1  68,6  -64,2  -9,9 
1989  54,7  72,1  -68,8  -7,8 
1990  40,4  57,2  -46,3  -34,3 
1991  -15,1  16,2  10,3  -13,5 
1992  -15,3  22,3  46,8  -11,3 
1993  -11,8  34,8  7,2  -12,8 
1994  -16,8  42,2  34,0  -18,6 
1995  -16,6  47,6  37,0  -24,8 
1996  -10,8  50,4  12,4  -33,5 
1997  -8,9  59,5  3,4  -26,2 
1998  -14,7  64,9  13,1  -57,8 
1999  -25,2  65,2  -10,4  -49,4 
2000  -35,2  59,1  34,2  153,8 
2001  0,4  95,5  -11,8  -14,8 
2002  43,0  132,8  -38,5  36,7 
2003  44,0  129,9  -61,8  23,5 
2004  102,9  156,1  -123,0  -24,8 
2005  116,6  158,2  -130,7  -21,6 
2006  141,5  159,0  -151,1  -31,5 
2007  184,2  198,6  -220,9  -85,1 
         
1) Exports minus imports       
2) Inflows minus outflows       






Figure 8: Inflation in Germany
Percentage change of CPI from previous year, 1980 to 1991 West 
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Figure 9: Structural Change in Germany   
Manufacturing value added as a percentage of total value added in West 
and East Germany respectively: 
















Figure 10: Unit Labour Costs in International Comparison
Relation of labour costs to labour productivity in the manufacturing sector; 
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Figure 11: Intermediate Input Shares
Intermediate inputs as a percentage of manufacturing production;

















Figure 12: Structure of Manufacturing Production
Value added (VA) and intermediate inputs (II) as a percentage of
manufacturing production on base of input-output tables;
Source: Federal Statistical Office; own calculations
































Figure 13: Development of the Oil Price 
















Figure 14: Euro-Dollar Exchange Rate 
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Figure 15: Share Prices in Germany and USA 
Germany: CDAX; USA: NYSE Composite; Index 1995 = 100; 















Figure 16: Investment in Germany
Investment in Machinery and Equipment; from 1980 to 1991 West 
Germany, from 1992 Germany; Index: 1980 = 100; 
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Figure 17: Labours Share in Germany
Labour compensations as a percentage of national income; 1980 to 1991 
West Germany, from 1991 Germany; 

















Figure 18: Population and Average Age in Germany 
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